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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
good faith was a defense to charges of discriminatory discharges even
when the employer knew that he was discharging workers expelled from
the union because of trying to change their bargaining representative at
an appropriate time; that the NLRA expressly authorized closed shop con-
tracts and the NLRB could not, by administrative amendment, make action
under such contracts an unfair labor practice.
It should be noted that this is not the rule under the Taft-Hartley Act,
successor to the NLRA. Under the Taft-Hartley Act dosed shop agree-
ments are invalid.i s Moreover, while maintenance-of-membership and
union shop agreements are valid,"' under this Act the employer apparently
is precluded from discharging employees expelled by the union if he has
reasonable grounds for believing that their union membership was termi-
nated because of rival union activity. 20
BmNARD R. HOLLANDmR
SALES - EXPRESS WARRANTY - REQUIREMENT OF PRIVITY
The plaintiff, relying on an express warranty which was printed on a
can of anti-freeze and which stated that the liquid therein was "safe," bought
the anti-freeze from a distributor who was not the manufacturer of the
product. The anti-freeze caused corrosion which damaged the plaintiffs
automobile. The plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer for breach
of the express warranty. Judgment was given in favor of the plaintiff by
the Municipal Court of Cincinnati. The defendant appealed on questions
" 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(3) (1946), as amended 61 STAT. 140
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (Supp. 1947) (Labor Management Act of
1947). Under § 8(a) (3) dosed shop agreements are prohibited but union shop
agreements and maintenance-of-membership agreements are permitted. TELLER,
LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING §§ 398.63 and 398.64 (Supp.
1948) See Note 1 supra.
"Ibid.
1"§ 8(a) (3) Proviued further, That no employer shall justify any discrimi-
nation against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he
has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not available to the
employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members,
or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or
terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic
dues and initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership." A further limitation restricting the employer's right to discharge
employees expelled for rival union activity designed to change representatives at an
approprtate time, was included in the Senate Bill, but does not appear in the final
enactment. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8(a) (3) (1947). The Rutland Court
case and doctrine were expressly presented at the Senate hearing, 93 Cong. Rec. 1891
(March 10, 1947), and it was reported that: "The Board's present policy, as enunci-
ated in the Rutland Court case and other cases applying that principle, is thus enacted
into law." SEN REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1947) (on S. 1126).
However, the above provision was not present in H.R. 3020 (the House bill) and
was omitted in conference.
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of law. Held: judgment of the lower court reversed. The court stated
that it is necessary to establish privity of contract between the parties in
order for the plaintiff to recover for breach of an express warranty where
the injury is to a chattel 1
Most courts which have followed the traditonal rule of denying re-
covery to the purchaser from an intermediate seller in an action against the
manufacturer for breach of warranty have insisted that warranty is con-
tractual and therefore require privity of contract between the parties before
imposing liability.2 Because of its historical origin and development, how-
ever, warranty liability is both tortious and contractual in nature.3 Some
American courts have expresssly recogmzed the split personality of war-
ranty and have stated that recovery may be had either in tort or in contract.4
Although the traditional rule requiring privity between the parties if re-
covery is to be had for breach of warranty presented not too great a prob-
lem when the system of distribution was typically that of the consumer
dealing directly with the manufacturer, under modern marketing methods
involving the use of many middlemen and extensive advertising by the
manufacturer aimed at the consumer, the rule has been strongly crized
by legal writers.5
The trend of judicial opinion is to extend to the ultimate consumer a
right of recovery for breach of warranty even though there is no privity of
contract between the parties. Such an extension was first made in cases
'Jordon v. Brouwer, 56 Ohio L. Abs. 495 (Ct. App. 1950).
21 WILLisTON, SALES § 2 4 4a (Rev. ed. 1948).
'Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 HARv. L Ruv. 1 (1888).
4Shippen v. Bowen, 122 U.S. 575, 7 Sup. Ct. 1283 (1887); Pearl v. William
Pilenes' Sons Co., 317 Mass. 529, 58 N.E. 595 (1945); Webb v. Brown & William-
son Tobacco Co., 121 W Va. 115, 2 S.E. 2d 898 (1939). The tort nature of war-
ranty has been acknowledged in applying the tort statute of limitations. Schlick
v. New York Dugan Bros. Inc., 22 N.Y.S.2d 238, 175 Misc. 182 (1940); Jones v.
Boggs & BuM, 355 Pa. 242, 49 A.2d 379 (1946). Cf. Lovich v. Salvation Army,
81 Ohio App. 317, 75 N.E.2d 459 (1947). The Uniform Sales Act, Section 12, in-
dudes both the tort and contract concepts of warranty in defining an express war-
ranty.
'5 Wmu.IsToN, CONTRACrS § 1505 (Rev. ed. 1937); 1 WLLiSTON, SALES §§ 244,
24 4a (Rev. ed. 1948); PRosstiR, ToR rs 689, 690 (1941). See also Spruill, Prsvity
of Contract as Requtsite for Recovery on Warranty, 19 N.C.L. REv. 551 (1949).
Manufacturers themselves commonly seem to repudiate the privity notion by regard-
ing themselves as directly accountable to the ultimate consumer. Bogert and Fink
Business Practice Regarding Warrantes n Sale of Goods, 25 ILL. L. Rav. 400, 416
(1930).
'PRossER, ToRTs §83 (1941). This trend is reminiscent of that which finally re-
suited in the repudiation of the requirement of privity as a basis for a negligence
action by the ultimate consumer against the manufacturer. The Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code extends liability for breach of express and implied warranty, re-
gardless of privity, to the consumer of the goods who is injured in person by the
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of injury to the person from food or beverages.7 The majority of recent cases
leaves little doubt that the extension is becoming the rule in good and bever-
age cases.' Recovery for personal injuries has been allowed on the basis of
warranty in actions against manufacturers brought by users of auto-
mobiles9 and other articles"0 which they had bought from intermediate
sellers. Finally, a few courts have extended the consumer's remedy for
breach of warranty against the manufacturer, without the requirement of
privity, to situations where the only damage was to property."'
DANIEL L. EKELMAN
breach of the warranty. Proposed Uniform Commercial Code §2-318 (Proposed
Final Draft, Spring 1950).
'Ketrerer v. Armour & Co., 200 Fed. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1912); Davis v. Van Camp
Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W 382 (1920); Hertzler v. Manshum, 228
Mich. 416, 200 N.W 155 (1924); Grapico Bottling Co. v. Ennis, 140 Miss. 502,
106 So. 97 (1926); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 NE.
557 (1928); Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 Ad. 537
(1931); Mazerti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
'Hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc., 110 F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1940); Blarjeske v. Thomp-
son's Restaurant Co., 325 I1. App. 189, 59 N.E.2d 320 (1945); Swengel v. F. & E.
Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77 P.2d 930 (1938); Helms v. General
Bakting Co., 164 S.W.2d 150 (Mo. App. 1942); Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v.
Copps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942); Nelson v. West Coast Dairy Co.,
5 Wash.2d 284, 105 P.2d 76 (1940).
'Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, afJ'd, 179 Wash. 123, 35
P.2d 1090 (1932) (allowed recovery on an express warranty made by advertise-
ment); see Murphy v. Plymouth Motor Corp., 3 Wash.2d 180, 183, 100 P.2d 30,32
(1940). Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W 309
(1939). But cf. Rachlin v. Libby-Owens Ford Glass Co., 96 F.2d 597 (2d Cit.
1938) (no breach of warranty); Channin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F.2d 889
(7th Cit. 1937).
°Lindroth v. Walgreen Co., 329 Ill. App. 105, 67 N.E.2d 595 (1946); Simpson
v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940); See Escola v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal.2d 453, 461-8, 150 P.2d 436, 440-4, (1944) (con-
curring opinion) Cf. Mannsz v. MacWhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3rd Cit. 1946);
Raymond v. J. R. Watkins Co., 88 F. Supp. 932 (D.C. Minn. 1950).
'Laclede Steel Co. v. Silas, 67 F. Supp. 751, (W.D. La. 1946) (scrap iron in
bundle compared with food placed in can by manufacturer with no opportunity for
inspection by consumer). In United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. City of Waco,
100 S.W.2d 1099 (Tex. Civ. App.) aff'd, 130 Tex. 126, 108 S.W.2d 432, cert.
dented 302 U.S. 749, 58 Sup. Ct. 266 (1937), recovery was allowed on an express
warranty. The court in affirming stated that the tendency of modern courts is away
from the narrow legalistic view of necessity of formal immediate privity of contract
in order to sue for breach of an express or implied warranty. Cf. North American
Fertilizer Co. v. Combs, 307 Ky. 869, 212 S.W.2d 526 (1948) (there is privity
between manufacturer and consumer); Ebers v. General Chemical Co., 310 Mich.
261, 17 N.W.2d 176 (1945) (manufacturer held liable for breach of warranty but
court talked of negligence); Wisdom v. Morris Hardware Co., 151 Wash. 86, 274
Pac. 1050 (1929) (based on fictitious agency)
[December
